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Note
It’s the Autonomy, Stupid: Political Data-Mining
and Voter Privacy in the Information Age
Chris Evans*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine American democracy without the secret ballot.
Candidates could effectively bribe and otherwise coerce voters.
Voters themselves would feel social pressure to vote against
dissenters and unpopular ideas. Minority viewpoints would
struggle to gain traction. Such was the state of elections in the
United States through most of the nineteenth century, prior to
widespread adoption of the secret ballot.1 By the turn of the
twentieth century, Progressives had successfully advocated for
introduction of the secret ballot “to enhance citizen independence and sincerity by freeing voters to vote their actual preferences rather than those of a party to which they felt beholden
or that they feared.”2 In theory, voters would be free to exercise
their basic democratic right autonomously and out of view of
the party bosses.3
Information Age political tactics are unraveling the anonymity afforded by the secret ballot. To more effectively target
voters, campaigns have become voracious collectors of personal
data.4 Databases operated by the major political parties as well
© 2012 Chris Evans
* J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School. Chris would like
to thank Professor McGeveran for his guidance and the editors and staff of the
Journal for their improvements to this Note.
1. James A. Gardner, Anonymity and Democratic Citizenship, 19 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS J. 927, 943 (2011) (“The principal justification for introducing
the secret ballot, a reform backed strongly by Progressives, was to break the
control that parties were thought to exercise over voters by depriving them of
the ability to enforce discipline at the polls.”).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Micah Sifry, How Obama’s Data-Crunching Prowess May Get
Him Re-Elected, CNN.COM (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/09/tech
/innovation/obama-data-crunching-election/index.html?hpt=hp_c2 (describing

867

013 EVANS_PROOF -SK - NO CHANGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

868

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:27 PM

[Vol. 13:2

as by candidates and consultants contain information gleaned
and purchased from public and private sources on nearly every
voter in the United States.5 The goal of these “digital dossiers”6
is to profile likely voters and identify traits that predict voting
habits.7 Political data-mining has proven to be a winning election tactic, but the resulting erosion of voter privacy has gone
unabated. Although voters still enjoy privacy once they enter
the voting booth, their movements outside the polling place are
cataloged to an extent that may defeat the purpose of secret
balloting.8
This Note will explore the unique threats to the right to
privacy posed by political data-mining. Section I explicates
modern privacy law and details the process of data-mining.
Section II examines how political campaigns use data-mining
and how political data-mining poses unique threats to privacy.
Section III looks at potential approaches to protecting privacy
from political data-mining and recommends that the United
States adopt a voter data disclosure law that allows voters to
see what data campaigns maintain about them and gives voters
the option of opting out of profiling.
the campaign’s success at the “modern mechanics of identifying, connecting
with and mobilizing voters, as well as the challenge of integrating voter information with the complex internal workings of a national campaign”).
5. James Verini, Big Brother Inc., VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2007, available at
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2007/12/aristotle200712?printable=
true&currentPage=all (“Aristotle’s massive private database contains detailed
information about roughly 175 million American voters.”); see also Garrett M.
Graff, They Have Your Number, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Oct. 1, 2008, at 48
available at http://www.washingtonian.com/print/articles/6/171/9627.html
(noting that the Catalist database “contains some 280 million individual records”).
6. “[D]igital dossiers are increasingly becoming digital biographies, a
horde of aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who
we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch.” DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE
168 (2004) [hereinafter SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON].
7. Leslie Wayne, Voter Profiles Selling Briskly as Privacy Issues Are
Raised, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at A10 (“[S]uch precise information is golden, enabling them to identify potential supporters and not waste money on the
unswayable.”).
8. “Development of the capacity for autonomous choice is an indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the governance of the community
and its constituent institutions—political, economic, and social.” Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives].
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I. BACKGROUND
A. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
When Warren and Brandeis wrote “The Right to Privacy”
in 1890, they were responding to technological advancements
and newspaper enterprises that “threaten[ed] to make good the
prediction that ‘what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’”9 They argued the law should
recognize and protect the individual’s privacy, separate from
existing slander, contract, and other laws.10 Seventy years later, William Prosser surveyed the still unsettled privacy landscape and identified four separate torts comprising the right to
privacy: 1) intrusion of solitude; 2) public exposure of private
facts; 3) false light publicity; and 4) appropriation of name or
likeness.11 Courts today recognize all four of these torts, and
many states have codified them.12 But as advancing technology
changes the way individuals keep information to themselves or
share it with others, legal scholars continue to struggle to de-

9. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
10. See id. at 197.
11. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
12. Intrusion of solitude (or upon seclusion) has three elements: “(1) an
intrusion; (2) that is highly offensive; and (3) into some matter in which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy.” Swarthout v. Mutual Service Life
Ins. Co., 632 N.W.2d 741, 744 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that illicitly obtaining a patient’s medical records may be a breach of privacy). Public exposure (or disclosure) of private facts occurs when “[p]ublicity [is] given to a matter concerning the private life of another, of a kind highly offensive to a
reasonable person.” Pachowitz v. LeDoux, 666 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Wis. Ct. App.
2003) (holding that disclosure of a patient’s medical condition by an emergency
medical technician to a coworker could constitute an invasion of privacy
claim). A claim of false light publicity requires “publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light” that “would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d
1051, 1059 (Ohio 2007) (holding false light publicity to be an actionable tort in
Ohio); see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY
LAW 24–25 (2003) (“The states have passed statutes protecting privacy in
many contexts . . . from employment records and medical records to library
records and student records.”); cf. Denver Pub. Co. v. Bueno, 54 P.3d 893, 894
(Colo. 2002) (declining to recognize false light publicity as a tort separate from
defamation). A person may be liable for a breach of privacy when he appropriates another person’s name or likeness “to his own use or benefit.” Remsburg
v. Docusearch, Inc., 149 N.H. 148, 157 (N.H. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C at 380) (explaining that personal information sold
for the value of the information itself is not an actionable appropriation).
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fine “privacy.”13
A key theoretical difficulty with defining the right to privacy is the overlapping areas of law that protect what we think of
as privacy.14 The Constitution protects citizens from breaches
of privacy by the government through the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments.15 The Supreme Court has also recognized
that the Bill of Rights casts “penumbras” which create certain
“zones of privacy” into which the government may not intrude.16 Breaches of privacy by nongovernmental entities fall
under the privacy torts or state and federal statutes.17 A person
who sexually harasses a coworker has violated the coworker’s
privacy,18 and an employee who breaks a confidentiality
agreement breaches his employer’s privacy.19 Neither case fits

13. See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477,
477–48 (2006) [hereinafter Solove, Taxonomy]. (“Privacy is far too vague a concept to guide adjudication and lawmaking, as abstract incantations of the importance of ‘privacy’ do not fare well when pitted against more concretely stated countervailing interests.”).
14. See, e.g. Smith v. Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding plaintiff’s false light privacy claim to be encompassed in her defamation claim); see also YAEL ONN ET AL., HAIFA CTR. OF LAW AND TECH., PRIVACY
IN THE DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 2–4 (2005); Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at
483 (noting that American privacy law “extend[s] beyond torts to the constitutional ‘right to privacy,’ Fourth Amendment law, evidentiary privileges, dozens of federal privacy statutes, and hundreds of state privacy statutes”).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press.”); U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”); U.S. CONST. amend.
V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding “that
the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house’”); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (noting that what information a
person “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public,
may be constitutionally protected”); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at
62–64.
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 470, 484 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4) (“There is a
need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to
privacy.”); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C § 6802 (2006) (restricting financial institutions’ use of consumers’ personal information).
18. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE 15 (2000) (“The sexual harassment cases . . . may be better conceived as invasions of privacy.”).
19. Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1271 (7th Cir. 1995) (sustaining an injunction because employee’s job would require disclosure of trade secrets protected by a confidentiality agreement).
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neatly within the privacy torts of intrusion on solitude or public
disclosure of private facts, but both are apparently breaches of
privacy. Sexual harassment statutes exist to govern the first
case, and the law of contracts exists for the second. But other
exposures of private facts and intrusion on solitude fall outside
the privacy torts, contract law, and statutes yet still breach
privacy.20 Privacy often exists in the negative space between
laws, making it difficult to define.
1. Limitations to the Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been defined broadly as the “claim
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them
is communicated to others,”21 but observers have identified several limitations. Among those limitations, some argue that information involving the public interest should not be suppressed by privacy laws.22 Warren and Brandeis argued privacy
was not breached by disclosures in “court[s] of justice, in legislative bodies, or the committees of those bodies” or in other
public bodies.23 They also would exempt oral disclosures of private information from privacy law.24 Once an individual consents to publish private facts, he loses his right to privacy in
those facts.25 The privacy torts generally only protect information that would be “highly offensive” to a reasonable person.26 The Constitution “protects people, not places,”27 but constitutional protections against governmental breaches of
privacy generally do not extend to public spaces, nor do they restrict invasions of privacy by private parties.28 Warren and
Brandeis recommended damages and injunctive relief as remedies for breaches of privacy, but were more skeptical of levying
20. See, e.g., SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 81 (“Although
contract law can protect privacy within relationships formed between parties,
it does not redress privacy invasions by third parties outside of the contractual
bonds.”).
21. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967).
22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 215.
23. Id. at 216.
24. Id. at 217.
25. Id. at 218.
26. See supra note 12.
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (holding that
“[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).
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criminal sanctions.29
The rights of private entities who breach privacy interests
frequently outweigh the rights of the party whose privacy has
been breached.30 Particularly in cases of political speech, courts
balance the right to privacy against free speech and the free
flow of information—and privacy usually loses.31 The First
Amendment protects political speech above all other speech,
but certain expressive activity falling under that protection
breaches privacy.32 However, privacy may outweigh free speech
interests if speech about private information is considered to
hold a lower value than speech about public information.33
2. Privacy-Related Harms
Defamation, slander, breaches of confidentiality agreements, sexual harassment, identity theft, intentional infliction
of severe emotional distress are all causes of action that describe invasions of privacy, but they do not fully describe the
nature of privacy or the nature of the harm when privacy is
breached.34 Warren and Brandeis wrote of the necessity of
29. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 219–20.
30. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859, 860 (2011)
(“High Court rulings since [McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334
(1995)] have consistently upheld disclosure requirements in election law.”).
31. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Talking About You, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2000) (“While privacy protection secured by contract
is constitutionally sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law.”); see, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (holding individuals’ privacy interest in illegally-recorded
conversations did not justify proscribing broadcast by the media); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“The ability of government, consonant with
the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it
is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.”); see also Raymond T. Nimmer, “Privacy” and “Data Protection” Defined—”Data Protection”
as a Contrasting Idea, in THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 17:5 (4th ed.
2011).
32. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21–22 (1971) (holding that wearing a
“Fuck the Draft” jacket in public did not violate the privacy of bystanders to a
sufficiently intolerable extent to justify prosecution).
33. See Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 984 (2003).
34. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 18, at 17 (“Many of the liberties on this
remarkable list are better conceived as invasions of privacy than as gender
discrimination.”).
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“some retreat from the world,” and that invasion of privacy
causes the individual “mental pain and distress.”35 They also
noted that some breaches of privacy can “destroy[] at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling.”36 That injury can
be defined as harm to the individual’s autonomy.37 The harms
to privacy are not to reputation like defamation, nor are they to
economic interests like a breach of contract. Rather, the harms
are psychic in nature, such as “incivility, lack of respect, or
causing emotional angst.”38 Another category of injury related
to privacy includes privacy architecture that involves “the creation of the risk that a person might be harmed in the future.”39
B. PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE
Rapid technological advancement has made retreat from
the world a more complicated concept. Moore’s Law states that
the number of transistors that can fit on a microchip doubles
every two years.40 At the time of Prosser’s article, engineers
were putting around thirty transistors on a chip.41 In 2012, Intel expects to release its latest chip, “Poulson,” which it claims
will hold 3.1 billion transistors.42 This exponential growth in
the memory and speed of processors has made possible technological advancement as well as new ways to encroach on privacy.43 The Internet, computers, cameras, and other technologies
have collected and exposed individuals’ personal information in
ways unforeseen by Prosser and earlier privacy scholars.44

35. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 9, at 196.
36. Id.
37. Autonomy harms are “privacy harms affect the nature of society and
impede individual activities that contribute to the greater social good.” Solove,
Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 488.
38. Id. at 486.
39. Id. at 487.
40. Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law,
INTEL.COM (2005), available at ftp://download.intel.com/museum/ Moores_
Law/Video-Transcripts/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_ Moore.pdf.
41. Id.
42. Pauline Nist, Itanium Poulson Update - Greater Parallelism, New Instruction Replay & More: Catch the Details from Hotchips!, THE SERVER ROOM
BLOG (Aug. 19, 2011), http://communities.intel.com/community/openportit/
server/blog/2011/08/19/itanium-poulson-update--greater-parallelism-new-in
struction-replay-more-catch-the-details-from-hotchips.
43. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 14 (“As processing
speeds accelerated and as memory ballooned, computers provided a vastly increased ability to collect, search, analyze, and transfer records.”)
44. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 478 (“[N]ew technologies have
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1. Privacy-breaching Technology
To demonstrate the new threats to privacy, students at
Fordham Law School compiled a fifteen-page personal dossier
on Justice Antonin Scalia based on information found on the
Web.45 Such a dossier goes well beyond the newspaper accounts
of Samuel Warren’s daughter’s wedding that inspired “The
Right to Privacy.”46 The threats to privacy contemplated by
Warren and Brandeis and Prosser do not map neatly onto
twenty-first century technology.47 Cameras, cell-phones, consumer transactions, Global Positioning System (GPS) devices in
cars, tollbooths, email, monitoring software, cookies, and other
technologies produce vast amounts of personal data in increasingly large and powerful databases.48 Consumers’ quotidian
transactions that once left no trace now leave behind a digital
trail.49 The Internet has created new activities that leave behind their own traceable digital trails.50 Technology allows consumers to shop from the privacy of their homes, but online
shopping produces data that can be cataloged, so even though
any single transaction might be noticed by fewer onlookers, the
details of that transaction will be remembered in the consumer’s “digital dossier.”51

given rise to a panoply of new privacy harms.”).
45. See Noam Cohen, Law Students Teach Scalia About Privacy and the
Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2009, at B3. Justice Scalia called the exercise “an
example of perfectly legal, abominably poor judgment.” Id.
46. ROSEN, supra note 18, at 7 (“What outraged Brandeis and Warren was
a mild society item in the Boston Saturday Evening Gazette that described a
lavish breakfast party Warren himself had put on for his daughter’s wedding.”).
47. See generally Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79
WASH. L. REV. 119 (2004) (analyzing privacy issues with modern technology).
48. See, e.g., ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 283–300 (2005);
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1473–1501
(2000).
49. See O’HARROW, supra note 48, at 284–85 (describing the types of data
companies record: web-browsing data, TiVO data, credit card transactions,
etc.).
50. “Clickstream data,” for example, includes “data about [the user’s] ISP,
computer hardware and software, the website she linked from, and exactly
what parts of the website she explored and for how long.” SOLOVE, DIGITAL
PERSON, supra note 6, at 23–24.
51. Id. at 1 (“A dossier is a collection of detailed data about an individual.”).
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2. Threats to Privacy from Aggregation
Although individuals might not expect any particular personal datum to remain secret, aggregation of personal data “reveals facts about data subjects in ways far beyond anything
they expected when they gave out the data.”52 Transactional
data can be analyzed in the aggregate to identify market trends
or it can be linked to individuals to identify individual habits.53
Aggregation was historically not considered among privacy
harms because the technology making aggregation possible and
profitable came about in recent decades.54 In at least one case,
the Supreme Court recognized aggregation of public information as an intrusion into privacy, noting “the distinction, in
terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of the
bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of
the rap sheet as a whole.”55 Justice Sotomayor, concurring in
United States v. Jones, discussed the dangers to privacy in the
digital age when the government aggregates personal data,
proposing that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”56 Aggregation violates privacy by revealing aspects of a person’s private
life he might prefer to be kept private.57 But aggregation cre-

52. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507. “When analyzed, aggregated
information can reveal new facts about a person that she did not expect would
be known about her when the original, isolated data was collected.” Id. at 506.
53. See id. at 511–12.
54. Id. at 505–06 (describing the apprehension that arose in the 1960s
when the rise of computers allowed for aggregation of data).
55. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489
U.S. 749, 764 (1989) (holding disclosure of Federal Bureau of Investigation rap
sheets to be an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy). Other courts, however, have found this analysis of aggregation inapplicable outside Freedom of
Information Act cases. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 519.
56. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. No. 10–1259, 5 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring). The government argued warrantless GPS tracking is permissible
because individuals have no expectation of privacy in public spaces, but Respondent argued the expectation to be seen at discrete times and places is not
the expectation for each discrete sighting to be aggregated. See Brief of Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent, United States v. Jones, No. 10-1259, 2011 WL 4564007 (Oct. 3,
2011) (“GPS tracking systems allow officers to comb stored data to conduct
new searches using a suspect’s historical location data, as well as to aggregate
data from a variety of sources, both public and private.”).
57. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507 (aggregation upsets individuals’ expectations about “certain limits on what is known about them and on
what others will find out”).
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ates distorted summaries of individuals because “the data is often reductive and disconnected from the original context in
which it was gathered.”58 The harm from data-mining generally
comes from “being misdefined and judged out of context in a
world of short attention spans, a world in which information
can easily be confused with knowledge.”59
3. Existing Data Privacy Laws
Congress has enacted a variety of laws intended to protect
privacy in specific, limited contexts. The Privacy Act of 1974
governs governmental agencies’ collection and maintenance of
personal information.60 The Cable Communications Policy Act
of 1984 “requires cable operators to inform subscribers about
the nature and uses of personal information collected”61 and to
obtain consent from subscribers before collecting personal information. Additionaly it prohibits cable operators from disclosing personal information unless doing so is necessary for “legitimate business activity related to, a cable service or other
service provided by the cable operator to the subscriber.”62 The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 “restricts the
interception of transmitted communications and the searching
of stored communications.”63 The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988 restricts disclosure of information
between federal agencies and requires agencies to provide individuals with a copy of their records on request.64 The Driver’s
Privacy Protection Act of 1994 deals with the issue of the government selling data to private parties by restricting the disclosure and resale of information obtained by state departments of motor vehicles.65 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
prohibits financial institutions from sharing nonpublic personal
information with third parties without allowing consumers to

58. Id. at 507.
59. ROSEN, supra note 18, at 8.
60. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
61. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 68.
62. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(A) (2006).
63. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22; 2701–10 (2006). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON,
supra note 6, at 68.
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2006). See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6,
at 69.
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opt out.66 States too have statutes protecting data privacy, such
as the Minnesota Data Practices Act, which governs the “collection, creation, storage, maintenance, dissemination, and access
to government data in government entities.”67 All these statutes contain loopholes that allow for privacy to be breached.68
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recommended a set
of voluntary data privacy principles for private entities to
adopt.69 The four principles are: 1) giving consumers “transparency and control”; 2) “reasonable security and limited data retention”; 3) notice of privacy policy changes; and 4) “affirmative
express consent before they use sensitive data.”70 The FTC does
not mandate adoption of these principles, but some entities
have voluntarily incorporated them into their privacy policies.71
More recently, the White House released its Consumer Privacy
Bill of Rights and called on Congress to codify its contents and
grant the FTC authority to enforce it.72
4. Redefining the Right to Privacy in the Digital Age
The broadening universe of data sources has led to new
ways of conceptualizing the right to privacy. A brief overview of
these approaches provides a useful toolbox for evaluat-

70.

66. 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2006); see SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at

67. MINN. STAT. § 13.01 subd. 3 (2011). The statute also limits the state’s
use of cookies to collect information. MINN. STAT. § 13.15 (2011).
68. The Privacy Act of 1974, Computer Matching and Privacy Protection
Act, and Minnesota Data Practices Act govern only government records. 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 13.01 subd. 3 (2011). The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 allows disclosure of personal information as
part of “legitimate business activity.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(2)(A) (2006). The Electronic Communications Privacy Act “is not well-tailored to addressing a large
portion of private-sector information gathering in cyberspace.” SOLOVE,
DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 69. The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act applies only to departments of motor vehicles and not to other state agencies. Id.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s “opt-out default creates incentives for privacy notices
that lead to inaction by the consumer.” Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz,
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information Privacy, and the Limits of Default
Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1241 (2002).
69. FTC STAFF REPORT: SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING 11–12 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov
/os/2009/02/P085400behavadreport.pdf [hereinafter FTC STAFF REPORT].
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY 35–36 (2012).
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ing twenty-first century privacy breaches. Daniel Solove’s Taxonomy of Privacy attempts to flesh out the right to privacy by
naming four categories of harmful activities having to do with
personal information: 1) collection, 2) processing, 3) dissemination, and 4) invasion.73
Neil Richards suggests moving away from the concept of
privacy in the realm of personal data and instead conceptualizing the problem in terms of data protection and confidentiality.74 Richards argues that “‘data protection’ can draw attention
to the specific problems associated with databases without risking an association with all of the assorted baggage that privacy
connotes.”75 Based on the data protection paradigm, the 1996
European Community Directive on Data Protection supplies a
Digital Age framework for personal data.76 The Directive limits
acceptable uses of personal data and allows individuals to
maintain some control over their personal information.77 It also
requires member countries to balance privacy rights with the
free flow of data.78 The five principles of the EU Directive are
that personal data are: 1) “processed fairly and lawfully”; 2)
“collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes”; 3)
“adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed”; 4) “accurate”; and 5) “kept in a form which permits identification of
data subjects for no longer than is necessary.”79 This approach
is consistent with Westin’s definition of privacy as the “claim of
individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves
when, how, and to what extent information about them is
73. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 489. This Note will focus on
harms from processing and dissemination, because these categories tend to
include the harms associated with political data-mining.
74. Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project, 94 GEO. L.J.
1087, 1135 (2006).
75. Id. at 1137; see also Raymond T. Nimmer, “Privacy” and “Data Protection” Defined-—”Data Protection” as a Contrasting Idea, in THE LAW OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 17:5 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that data protection “centers on control of personally identifiable data, rather than on protected secrecy.”).
76. Council Directive 95/46, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 38 (EC) [hereinafter EU DIRECTIVE].
77. Id.
78. Id. at art. 1 (“Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the
free flow of personal data between Member States for reasons connected with
the protection afforded under paragraph 1.”).
79. Id. at art. 6.
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communicated to others.”80
Another useful approach to privacy in the computing age
may be “contextual integrity.”81 Individuals pass through a variety of different spheres or contexts in their day-to-day lives,
and each sphere comes with its own set of norms.82 Personal information that may be shared in certain contexts cannot be appropriately shared in others.83 Privacy is breached when these
norms are transgressed.84 For example, a vendor who maintains records of its customers’ purchases and contact information operates within these norms, but the vendor transgresses norms of appropriateness and distribution by sharing
customer information with third parties.85 Cheaper, more powerful technology lowers the cost of breaching contextual integrity by recording personal information and storing it for a fraction of what it would cost to manually do so. Furthermore,
aggregating data adds value, thus making the practice of systematically breaching contextual integrity profitable.
C. DATA-MINING CONSUMER INFORMATION
The parties to a financial transaction are said to equally
own the facts to the transaction.86 But advancing technology
has made collection, aggregation, and dissemination of personal
information feasible and profitable for an increasing number of
actors, many of whom are not present at the initial transaction.87 The data from these transactions are compiled in con-

80. WESTIN, supra note 23, at 7.
81. Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 136–43 (describing the informational
norms of “appropriateness” and “distribution” and arguing that privacy is
breached when these norms are transgressed).
82. Individuals “are at home with families, they go to work, they seek
medical care, visit friends, consult with psychiatrists, talk with lawyers, go to
the bank, attend religious services, vote, shop,” and norms in each context
govern “roles, expectations, actions, and practices.” Id. at 137.
83. “[T]he patient shares information about his or her physical condition
with the physician but not vice versa.” Id. at 138. “[W]e are not (at least in the
United States) expected to share our religious affiliation with employers, financial standing with friends and acquaintances, performance at work with
physicians, etc.” Id. at 138–39.
84. Id. at 138 (“[A] complaint that privacy has been violated is sound in
the event that one or the other types of the informational norms has been
transgressed.”).
85. Id. at 152–53.
86. Froomkin, supra note 48, at 1502.
87. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 3–4 (2004) (“Countless
companies maintain computerized records of their customers’ preferences,
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sumer databases, aggregated, and sold.88 While this sort of consumer data-mining has existed for years, increasingly powerful
online tools now track users’ movements around the web and
compile digital dossiers.89 The commodification of personal data
allows websites to provide users with content free of charge;
users pay for content with their personal data instead of money.90 Shopper loyalty cards, another major source of consumer
data, make discounts and coupons available to users.91 Most
consumers probably understand that vendors compile data
about their customers, and many consumers probably understand that they trade their personal information in exchange
for the free use of websites, but “[f]ewer are aware that this information is shipped off and aggregated in data warehouses
where it is organized, stored, and analyzed.”92
1. Methods of Collecting Consumer Data
“Big Data” is a multi-billion dollar industry.93 Firms amass
data on everything from soil quality to medical information and

purchase, and activities. . . . [a]nd there are hundreds of companies people
aren’t even aware of that maintain their personal information.”); see also EU
DIRECTIVE, supra note 76, at paragraph (4) (“[T]he progress made in information technology is making the processing and exchange of such data considerably easier.”).
88. See SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 18–21. “There are
around five database compilers that have data on almost all households in the
United States.” Id. at 20.
89. See Julia Angwin, The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets, WALL ST.
J., July 30, 2010, at W1. “Tracking isn’t new. But the technology is growing so
powerful and ubiquitous that even some of America’s biggest sites say they
were unaware, until informed by the Journal, that they were installing intrusive files on visitors’ computers.” Id.
90. See generally FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 69, at i (“[P]otential benefits of the practice to consumers, include[] the free online content that online
advertising generally supports, the personalized advertising that many consumers may value, and a potential reduction in unwanted advertising.”).
91. See, e.g., Dan Sewell, Kroger Really Knows About Its Customers’ Buying Habits, THE LEDGER, (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.theledger.com
/article/20090106/NEWS/901060335. These cards have also been used to alert
consumers to product recalls. Steve Raabe, Shopper-card Data Traced for Other Uses, DENV. POST (June 10, 2010), http://www.denverpost.com/business
/ci_15264783.
92. Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 121.
93. See Quentin Hardy, The Big Business of ‘Big Data’, NYTIMES.COM
(Oct.
24,
2011)
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/10/24/big-data/
?scp=1&sq=data%20mining&st=cse (noting that Hewlett-Packard recently
bought a data company named Autonomy for $10.3 billion).
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“cleverly sift[] through it to find and exploit new patterns and
relationships.”94 The value from this activity comes from being
able to target ads for goods and services to likely customers,
thus limiting the waste of dollars spent on advertising to noncustomers.95 When an individual gives out personal information, he typically does so not expecting that data to be sold
to third parties for uses unrelated to the original transaction.96
Users of frequent shopper cards trade their contact information
for coupons and discounts.97 Vendors, such as grocery stores,
track customers’ purchases through the shopper cards, allowing
them to target relevant coupons at particular customers.98 But
third party data-miners may purchase shopper card data, aggregate it with other personal data, and resell it to other vendors without the individual’s knowledge.
A variety of data-mining tools surreptitiously gather information from web users. For many years, “cookies” have recorded the websites people visit.99 New tools “scan in real time
what people are doing on a Web page, then instantly assess location, income, shopping interests and even medical conditions.”100 The user need not complete a transaction for a tracker
to obtain information; a mere web search provides useful data.101 The information gathered by these tools is bought and

94. Id. Hardy makes the case that the Big Data bubble may be about to
burst as lofty expectations fall in line with reality and the technology “turn[s]
from a competitive edge into a must-have.” Id.
95. Id. (“When you know what someone has purchased, you can make a
case of what ad to put in front of them next.”).
96. “Secondary use resembles breach of confidentiality, in that there is a
betrayal of the person’s expectations when giving out information.” Solove,
Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 522.
97. Sewell, supra note 91.
98. Id. Simon Hay, CEO of Kroger’s data-mining firm, dunnhumby, notes
the dangers to Kroger of selling customer information to third parties: “We
understand that this is long-term, and if we do anything to exploit that relationship, then we destroy the value for our clients.” Id.
99. Angwin, supra note 89, at W1.
100. Id. “Tracking is done by tiny files and programs known as ‘cookies,’
‘Flash cookies’ and ‘beacons.’” Id.
101. The FTC provides the following example:
[A] consumer visits a travel website and searches for airline flights to
New York City. The consumer does not purchase any tickets, but later visits the website of a local newspaper to read about the Washington Nationals baseball team. While on the newspaper’s website, the
consumer receives an advertisement from an airline featuring flights
from Washington D.C. to New York City.
FTC STAFF REPORT supra note 69, at 3.

013 EVANS_PROOF -SK - NO CHANGES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

882

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

7/5/2012 1:27 PM

[Vol. 13:2

sold amongst a network of data firms and advertisers for the
purpose of creating precisely targeted ads to appeal to particular users.102 Some firms analyze the data to predict the user’s
tastes and preferences.103 Users themselves likely realize how
many tools are tracking them at any given time, but, more surprisingly, many website proprietors know how many cookies,
beacons, and other tools their own sites are installing on users’
computers.104
2. Harms from Consumer Data-Mining
In a situation where a citizen’s consumer, Internet, and political transactions are recorded, compiled, and sold, the citizen
suffers at least two injuries. First, knowing that his transactions are being observed—let alone recorded, compiled, and
commoditized—may cause the citizen to alter his behavior.105
In this way, the citizen’s autonomy is harmed; he may be discouraged from consumption or political participation that he
believes will be made public.106 Second, the aggregation of consumer and political transaction data creates digital dossiers—
rich descriptions of citizens’ lives that go beyond what an individual consents to as part of his public persona.107 Both harms
violate the individual’s autonomy by creating an imbalance in

102. See generally Angwin, supra note 89, at W1. See also FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 69, at i (defining online behavioral advertising as “the
practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in order to deliver advertising tailored to the individual’s interests.”).
103. Angwin, supra note 89, at W2. “[S]ome tracking companies use probability algorithms to try to pair what they know about a person’s online behavior with data from offline sources about household income, geography and education, among other things.” Id.
104. Id. The article reports that Comcast was unaware that Comcast.net
installed fifty-five cookies on the Wall Street Journal’s test computer. One
tracking company, BlueKai, allows individuals to see their digital profile and
opt out of tracking. BlueKai Registry, BLUEKAI, http://www.bluekai.com/reg
istry/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2012). The Wall Street Journal recently updated its
privacy policy to “allow the site to connect personally identifiable information
with Web browsing data without user consent.” Joe Coscarelli, The Wall Street
Journal’s New Privacy Policy Is Everything They Taught Us to Fear, DAILY
INTEL, (Sept. 28, 2011), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/09/the_wall
_street_journals_new_p.html.
105. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 488 (surveillance can have a
chilling effect on individuals, “making them less likely to attend political rallies or criticize popular views.”).
106. Id.
107. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 1.
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power relationships surrounding individual decision-making.108
Injuries to individual autonomy in the political sphere may be
uniquely harmful and require unique remedies.109
II. POLITICAL DATA-MINING
If the problem with data-mining in general is that it
“seek[s] to shape and predict individual behavior according to
externally-determined trajectories of opportunity and desire,”110 we should be particularly wary of its role in electoral
politics. Aristotle’s John Phillips admits, “[e]very campaign
that we work with wants you to believe that it’s shoe leather
that wins the race, or great issues, or the love of the people, but
the fact of the matter is a lot of it is the nitty-gritty organization.”111 Data-mining in the consumer sphere spurs concerns
over consumer privacy, but when the same techniques are used
in the political sphere “it begins to pull back the curtain of one
of the most protected locations in America, the voting booth.”112
In the past three decades, political candidates have increasingly come to rely on extensive, detailed voter databases—such as
Voter Vault, Catalist, and Aristotle—compiled from both publicly available election data and the consumer data compiled
over the years by businesses.113 Catalist, a privately-owned
progressive database, includes “data from frequent-buyer cards
at supermarkets and pharmacies, hunting- and fishing-license
registries, catalog- and magazine-subscription lists, membership rolls from unions, professional associations, and advocacy
groups such as the ACLU and the NRA.”114 In 2004, the Repub108. Richards, supra note 74, at 1094.
109. The secret ballot, after all, affords a zone of privacy for the voter that
consumers are not entitled to. Ari Schwartz, an analyst at the Center for Democracy and Technology said “we are especially concerned when we are talking about voting and citizenship, things that are so central to the election process.” Wayne, supra note 7, at A10.
110. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1376.
111. Verini, supra note 5.
112. Wayne, supra note 7, at A10.
113. See Verini, supra note 5 (“Aristotle can tell its clients more than just
the predictable stuff—where you live, your phone number, who lives with you,
your birthday, how many children you have. It may also know how much you
make, how much your house is worth, what kind of car you drive, what Web
sites you visit, and whether you went to college, attend church, own guns,
have had a sex change, or have been convicted of a felony or sex crime. It can
pry into every corner of your life.”). Every President since Ronald Reagan has
hired Aristotle as a consultant. Id.
114. Graff, supra note 5, at 40.
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lican National Committee (RNC) used its database, Voter
Vault, to establish data dominance by micro-targeting voters
who might otherwise have been excluded from mail drops.115 By
2008, the Democrats had surpassed the RNC’s data capabilities
through the privately run Catalist, and now the parties are engaged in a data-arms race for 2012.116 Matching personal data
to specific individuals allows candidates to send direct mail to
voters, canvas potentially friendly voters living in unfriendly
territory, and prospect potential donors.117 It also allows campaigns to evaluate likely voters based on patterns in data and
surveys, and then predict likely voting habits.118
While consumer data is compiled, aggregated, and sold by
private firms, an increasing amount of data on citizens is made
publicly available through government websites. Of particular
interest to political data-miners is data on voters and campaign
finance.119 Voter registration information is available through
many states’ Secretary of State120 as well as through private
services.121 Campaign finance data at the state, federal, and local levels are even easier to access online.122 With relatively lit115. See id.
116. Kate Kaye, Republican Party Aims to Match Democrats’ Data
Strength, CLICKZ (June 6, 2011), http://www.clickz.com/clickz/news/2076532/
republican-party-aims-match-democrats-strength; Sifry, supra note 4.
117. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 7, at A10 (describing how the political
consulting firm Aristotle provides data that allows candidates to send personalized letters to specific types of donors and to target “Fat Cats” for fundraising).
118. Graff, supra note 5, at 40 (“[S]ome of the strongest predictors of political ideology are things like education, homeownership, income level, and
household size. Religion and gun ownership are the two most powerful predictors of partisan ID.”).
119. Past voting and donation history are some of the most accurate predictors of future voting and donation habits.
120. See, e.g., Confidentiality Notice, OFFICE OF THE MINNESOTA
SECRETARY OF STATE, http://www.sos.state.mn.us/index.aspx?page=207 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“Access to the data that you supply on your voter registration application is restricted to elections officials and to those who obtain
the list for political, law enforcement and jury selection purposes.”).
121. See, e.g., VOTER HISTORY, http://voterhistory.com/ (last visited Mar. 9,
2012) (“For each voter, we have 10 year voting history (that’s 5 cycles for general, primary and joint(city) elections); demographic (data); home appraised
value; and (future) personality trait data that can be meaningful to targeting.”).
122. See Campaign Finance Reports Search and Lists, TEXAS ETHICS
COMMISSION, http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/dfs/search_CF.htm (last visited
Mar. 9, 2012). For example, the Texas Ethics Commission allows anyone visit-
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tle effort and cost, a data-miner can compile a useful voter database from just publicly available data.123 A data-miner can
then purchase consumer data and match it to the voting and
contribution data based on names and contact information.124
The result is a database that can quickly identify a citizen’s
name, address, employer, occupation, phone number, email address, party affiliation, voting history, donor history, purchasing habits, and web browsing history.125
Campaigns running their own databases from just publicly
available sources can augment their data with information
gleaned from their own voter contact, through canvassing,
phone banking, or fund-raising. The most sophisticated private
database operators allow campaigns that buy their lists to add
data to the master database from their own campaign databases and voter contact.126 When a campaign gathers information for its own use, the voter at least knows who is using
the data, but when voter data is compiled across candidates
and election cycles in large national databases, the voter can
lose sight of his information.
Campaigns have long used voter registration and history
data to target likely voters.127 Contribution history is an accurate predictor of future contributions, so this data has been a
staple of political fundraising. Federal contribution data is
readily available, but the Federal Election Campaign Act prohibits use of this data for fundraising or commercial purposes.128 Aggregation of personal data from a variety of sources
gives campaigns the power to create more detailed profiles of

ing its website to download its entire campaign finance report database, including names, addresses, occupations, employers, and contribution histories
of donors to political campaigns in Texas. Id.
123. See id.
124. See, e.g., Wayne, supra note 7, at A10 (noting that Aristotle blends
voter data it has collected with consumer data purchased from other databases).
125. Id.
126. Catalist asks its clients to report data they find during the campaign,
either in real-time or at the end of the campaign. Graff, supra note 5, at 43.
127. Verini, supra note 5 (recounting the data operations of Presidents
Carter, Kennedy, and Lincoln).
128. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (2006) (“[A]ny information copied from such reports or statements may not be sold or used by any person for the purpose of
soliciting contributions or for commercial purposes, other than using the name
and address of any political committee to solicit contributions from such committee.”).
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individual voters than ever before.129 One important use of these profiles has been micro-targeting, whereby a campaign can
tailor its message to certain voters with relative precision.130
Where in the past a campaign might send a piece of direct mail
to every female who voted in three of the past four Democratic
primaries, now campaigns can target, say, Volvo drivers, or visitors to The Drudge Report. Campaigns can micro-target to encourage friendly voters to cast ballots for a candidate, or they
can micro-target to suppress their opponent’s voters.131 By
some estimates, micro-targeting allowed George W. Bush to
win Ohio, and thus reelection, in 2004.132
New methods of politicking yield more data. President
Obama’s campaign Facebook page has twenty-three million
“likes” and an app to gather data on all those twenty-three million users.133 President Obama’s campaign shares data from
field-level organizers up the hierarchy through its own social
networking tool.134 The ability of databases to keep track of
129. Graff, supra note 5, at 39 (“In past years, campaigns couldn’t sort the
electorate and use finely grained outreach and mobilization techniques. Today,
thanks to expensive and powerful databases like the GOP’s Voter Vault and
the progressive startup Catalist, targeting voting blocs is as simple as checking boxes on a computer screen.”).
130. In 2008, the Obama campaign was able to “custom-tailor cabletelevision ads down to the Zip Code in Iowa, or send a canvasser to a voter’s
doorstep armed with a computer-generated picture of that person’s political
personality.” Verini, supra note 5.
131. See Nichole Rustin-Paschal, Symposium, Online Behavioral Advertising and Deceptive Campaign Tactics: Policy Issues, 19 WM & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 907, 913 (2011) (“In an increasingly information-based society, deceptive
campaigns will likely be launched in ways that take advantage of tools provided by web-based technologies for communicating and organizing.”).
132. Vanity Fair reports that in 2004 Karl Rove took advantage of microtargeting to “sen[d] shock troops into Democratic pockets of blue-collar workers and minorities with personalized appeals to the churchgoing, the gunowning, the abortion-hating. The result was a lead of 130,000 votes that
tipped the election to Bush.” Verini, supra note 5. On the other hand, Democratic National Committee chairman Terry McAuliffe remarked, upon learning
his party’s database contained 1.1 million incorrect entries in Florida in 2000,
“Don’t you think we could have found 537 votes if we had corrected that information earlier and contacted 1.1 million more people?” Graff, supra note 5,
at 40.
133. Sifry, supra note 4 (“Users of the Obama 2012 - Are You In? app are
not only giving the campaign personal data like their name, gender, birthday,
current city, religion and political views, they are sharing their list of friends
and information those friends share, like their birthday, current city, religion
and political views.”).
134. Id. (NationalField allows the campaign to compile “information they
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voters who move across state lines eliminates the old problem
of losing data on voters who move.135 Local campaigns also take
advantage of big voter databases; Fort Wayne, Indiana Republican mayoral candidate Paula Hughes used Voter Vault in her
unsuccessful 2011 campaign.136 Although Hughes lost, the data
collected by her campaign will be valuable for candidates in the
2012 cycle.137 At the cutting edge of political data-mining, the
Obama campaign’s “Dreamcatcher” project will use text analytics to glean political beliefs and motivations from voters’ narratives entered on the campaign’s website.138
Political data-mining raises a variety of concerns that this
Note will only briefly discuss. Databases containing personal
voter information have been compromised in the past. One of
the largest voter databases, Aristotle, was caught selling data
to unverified individuals, such as “Britney Spears” and “Condoleezza Rice,” in 2003.139 Aristotle also falsely claimed at the
time that it “never added information from market research to
its voter files”140 Aristotle sells data to Democrats and Republicans, as well as candidates from Ukraine, Algeria, Kosovo,
Venezuela, and the Palestinian Fatah party.141 The Obama and
McCain campaigns’ computers were hacked during the 2008
election.142 Micro-targeting can lead to a different set of harms,

are gathering as they work on tasks like signing up volunteers, knocking on
doors, identifying likely voters and dealing with problems,” as well as “qualitative data.”).
135. Graff, supra note 5, at 43.
136. Tom LoBianco, Ind. Dems, GOP Use Mayoral Races to Build for 2012,
POST TRIBUNE (Indiana) (Oct. 30, 2011), http://posttrib.suntimes.com/news/
8512679-418/ind-dems-gop-use-mayoral-races-to-build-for-2012.html (“Hughes
has gotten access to more voters and the state party has updated its vast store
of information relying on phone calls and canvassing done on Hughes’ behalf.”).
137. See id.
138. Sasha Issenberg, Project Dreamcatcher: How cutting-edge text analytics can help the Obama campaign determine voters’ hopes and fears,
SLATE.COM (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/victory_lab/2012/01/project_dreamcatcher_how_cutting_edge_text_analytics_c
an_help_the_obama_campaign_determine_voters_hopes_and_fears_.html.
139. Kim Zetter, For Sale: The American Voter, WIRED.COM (Dec. 11, 2003),
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2003/12/61543.
140. Id. Aristotle now acknowledges “that it adds consumer marketing data
to voter information.” Kim Zetter, Voter Privacy Is Gone–Get Over It,
WIRED.COM (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/01/voterprivacy-i/.
141. Verini, supra note 5.
142. Philip N. Howard & Daniel Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy:
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especially voter deception.143
III. APPROACHES TO PROTECTING VOTER PRIVACY
If enacted, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights will change
the ways private firms collect consumer data and at least have
some effect on the voter data campaigns gather from dataminers, but it is not clear whether the codified Bill would apply
directly to political data-mining.144 The Bill’s principles should
apply to political data-mining, so a voter privacy measure
would be a valuable outcome of the multi-stakeholder process
encouraged by the White House.145 American democracy already recognizes and protects voter privacy, at least at the polling place.146 But political life encompasses more than merely
casting a ballot; new technology allows for broad dissemination
of views and new means of debate.147 Political participation
online may be stifled without privacy protections—scrutiny of
online voter activity may distort voter participation.148 Given
Australia, Canada,the United Kingdom, and United States in Comparative
Perspective, FIRST MONDAY (2010), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2975/2627.
143. See Rustin-Paschal, supra note 131, at 914 (arguing that the Internet
“serve[s] not only to bring people together, but to launch deceptive campaigns”); Daniel Kreiss, Yes We Can (Profile You), 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 70,
74 (2012), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacyparadox/political-data. (noting that micro-targeting means “campaigns can develop narrow appeals based on ideology and self-interest and direct them to
different groups of voters, appearing to be all things to all people.”).
144. See WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72, at 10 (“The Consumer Privacy Bill
of Rights applies to commercial uses of personal data.”).
145. See id. at 23–24 (discussing the multi-stakeholder process).
146. See Nissenbaum, supra note 47, at 146 (“From the moment [voters]
cross the threshold, information flows are highly regulated, from what elections officers can ask them to what they can ask officers, what voters are required to document in writing, who sees it, what happens to the vote cast and
who sees that, what exit pollsters can ask citizens as they leave—for whom
they voted but not voters’ names—and what the exit pollsters are free to disseminate publicly.”).
147. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 928 (“But political participation in modern democratic life can take many forms: financial contributions to candidates,
political parties, and advocacy groups; petition signing; political speech and
debate; communication with and lobbying of officials; attending public meetings; holding office . . . paying taxes, obeying the law, or performing public
service or charitable work in one’s community.”).
148. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1651 (1999) (“[W]ho will speak or listen when this behavior leaves
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that accessing democratic forums on the Internet creates a
traceable digital trail, “merely listening on the Internet becomes a speech-act.”149 In this way, data-mining of political information can compromise self-government while falling under
First Amendment protection. Political data-mining can also detract from voter autonomy when “[i]ts perfected surveillance of
naked thought’s digital expression short-circuits the individual’s own process of decisionmaking.”150
A. PAST ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT VOTER PRIVACY
If privacy is defined as the “claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to
what extent information about them is communicated to others,”151 then existing law fails to protect the privacy of individuals from political data-mining. Citizens lose sight of bits of data
gleaned
from
consumer
transactions,
campaign
contributions, and government documents once that data comes
into the possession of other parties to a transaction.152 Citizens
have limited control at best over what third parties gain access
to their information.153 Aggregation of data from various
sources provides data-miners with a fuller picture of an individual than they intend to reveal.154 When an individual buys a
car, he does not expect that transaction to lead to a political
consultant categorizing him as a particular type of voter likely
to be susceptible to a certain political ad.155
1. Existing Law Does Not Protect Data Privacy
The four privacy torts appear inadequate to deal with
technology-driven threats to privacy. Intrusion upon seclusion
protects material of a particularly sensitive nature, not the
finely-grained data trails in a fashion that is difficult to understand or anticipate?”).
149. Id. at 1652.
150. Id. at 1656.
151. WESTIN, supra note 21, at 7.
152. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 506–07.
153. See id.
154. See Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507 (“Aggregation upsets these expectations, because it involves the combination of data in new, potentially
unanticipated ways to reveal facts about a person that are not readily
known.”).
155. See, e.g., Graff, supra note 5, at 41 (“Jaguar, Land Rover, and Porsche
owners tend to be more Republican, while Subaru, Hyundai, and Volvo drivers
lean Democratic.”).
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seemingly mundane and often public details of consumer
transactions.156 Public disclosure of private facts also protects
only information that would be “highly offensive,” and the sale
of data between private databases does not rise to a sufficient
level of publicity.157 False light publicity protects only against
reputational harms, not the injuries to autonomy inflicted by
data-mining.158 Appropriation of name or likeness protects the
value of an individual’s identity, not the value added from aggregation.159 Statutes intended to protect privacy seem similarly ill equipped to handle high-tech threats to privacy.160
The approach to protecting voter privacy in the United
States has been piecemeal and, many would argue, unsuccessful. Two substantial problems stand in the way of voter privacy
legislation: voter apathy and the First Amendment.161 Most data compilation occurs by a gradual process of accretion from
transactions, so the violation of privacy goes unnoticed to the
individual.162 Consequently, most individuals do not know the
extent to which they are being profiled. Laws that burden political speech must serve a compelling governmental interest and
be narrowly tailored to serve that interest.163 How restrictive a
regime can be applied to political data-mining thus depends in
part on whether the activity of data-miners is speech at all and,
if so, whether it is commercial speech (which receives limited
First Amendment protection)164 or political speech (which re-

156. SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 6, at 59 (“[C]ourts have rejected
intrusion actions based on obtaining a person’s unlisted phone number, selling
the names of magazine subscribers . . . and collecting and disclosing an individual’s past insurance history.”).
157. Id. at 59–60.
158. Id. at 60.
159. Id. at 60–61.
160. See supra note 68.
161. See, e.g., Howard & Kreiss, supra note 142 (“On First Amendment
grounds, provided they remain non–state actors candidates and parties enjoy
broad latitude with respect to their data practices.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (holding “privacy concerns give way when balanced
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.”).
162. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 507.
163. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010).
164. Cent. Hudson Gas v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980)
(“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 456, 457 (1978)).
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ceives the highest First Amendment protection).165 In the past,
courts have treated the collection and dissemination of voter
data by pollsters as political speech, protected under the First
Amendment.166 Other courts have casually dealt with data as
speech, relying heavily on a “slippage between images of information as speech and as (owned and traded) commodity . . . .”167
But regulation of other information markets, such as securities,
intellectual property, and computer crimes, is permissible under the First Amendment.168 Many restrictions on political
speech have been upheld under strict scrutiny.169 Nevertheless,
“[p]rivacy rules punishing or preventing the dissemination of
truthful information have long been perceived as threatening
core First Amendment values . . . .”170
2. Theories and Proposals to Protect Data Privacy
Under a property rights conception of privacy, the key
question is to whom personal data belongs; operators of databases argue that they “own” the data,171 while some privacy
advocates argue individuals should be allowed to buy and sell
their own personal information.172 Another approach would
seek to maximize the freedom of various actors to choose the
disposition of their data.173 A third approach argues that “the
collection and processing of personal data creates knowledge,”
165. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“The First Amendment ‘has its fullest and most urgent application’ to speech uttered during a campaign for political office.”) (quoting Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 223 (1989)).
166. E.g., Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Colburg, 699 F. Supp. 241, 242 (D. Mont.
1988) (“Gathering and dissemination of information concerning why and how
people vote constitutes speech which is protected by the first amendment.”).
167. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1413–14.
168. Id. at 1416–17; see also Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1653 (2009)
(discussing the “tension between these two very different First Amendment
regimes for civil liability” in torts versus contract and property claims).
169. E.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa., 944 F.2d
137, 139 (3rd Cir. 1991) (upholding prohibitions against judicial candidates
“announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues” and soliciting
campaign contributions).
170. Richards, supra note 74, at 1119.
171. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1378 (“Opponents of
strengthened privacy protection . . . point to their investment in compiling the
databases and developing algorithms to “mine” them for various purposes.”).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1391–92 (“What matters most is that personal data is owned at
the end of the day in the manner the parties have agreed.”).
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and marketers armed with this knowledge are better able to
serve consumers.174 A fourth approach looks at the relationship
between data and speech, and concludes that privacy “interfere[s] with the speech rights of would-be data-collectors to
spread any judgments, generalizations, and correlations that
are salable and not demonstrably false.”175
The most recent attempts at privacy reform in the United
States focus on notice and consent—whether individuals “fully
understand and appreciate what information is being collected
about them, and whether or not they are empowered to stop
certain practices from taking place.”176 The Commercial Privacy
Bill of Rights Act, proposed in April 2011, would create a
broader privacy law than those currently enacted and allow
consumers to access data about themselves and block some uses of it.177 The White House’s Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights
establishes a framework for data privacy based on individual
control, transparency, respect for context, security, access and
accuracy, focused collection, and accountability.178 This approach most closely resembles the freedom of choice theory.
Absent new restrictions on political data-mining, the low
cost and easy availability of political information such as voter
registration, voting history, and campaign contributions, may
actually slow (but not stop) the erosion of privacy. If a campaign can easily access such data through government websites, and then manage the data on increasingly powerful personal computers with common software such as Excel or
Access, it might choose to spend more on television buys and
hire a part-time (or volunteer) in-house data manager to query
the data for likely voters and donors rather than hiring a data
firm. A campaign could potentially hand the job of downloading

174. Id. at 1402.
175. Id. at 1409.
176. Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Sci. and Transp., 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller
IV, Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp.), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Hearings&ContentRecord_id=
0bfb9dfc-bbd7-40d6-8467-3b3344c72235&Statement_id=21f3326d-345f-4aaab105-0532997b481e&ContentType_id=14f995b9-dfa5-407a-9d35-56cc7152a7ed
&Group_id=b06c39af-e033-4cba-9221-de668ca1978a&MonthDisplay=7&Year
Display=2010 (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
177. Julia Angwin, Senators Offer Privacy Bill to Protect Personal Data,
WALL ST. J, April 13, 2011, at B1.
178. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 72, at 47–48.
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voter rolls and campaign finance reports to a volunteer and not
even bother raising the money that would have been spent on a
data firm. The candidate might spend less time in the call room
raising money and more time on voter contact. The mark-up for
data consultants may decrease along with the demand for their
services. Unregulated, the political information trade could
cease to be so lucrative as it becomes democratized.179 Still, the
aggregation of consumer data with political data would remain
a powerful tool—especially for statewide and federal campaigns. However, easy access to political data means more
campaigns have the opportunity to breach voter privacy.180
Some proposed remedies to political data protection problems are overly restrictive, under-protective, or both. Johnson
et al. recommend making donor data “read only” to increase the
cost of importing such data into political databases.181 This
would seem to only bar outsider candidates with limited resources from using the data, while professional political dataminers will quickly find a way to work around the nuisance—
making their service even more valuable.182 They also propose
limiting the lifespan of contributor data, but again, professional
data-miners could quickly find a work-around and mark-up the
cost of their services. One possibility for reform would be to
prohibit the processing of data revealing political beliefs, as the
EU directive does.183 Such an approach may or may not be
permissible under the First Amendment.184 But a broad prohibition would foreclose the benefits of political data-mining,

179. Cf. Hardy, supra note 93 (remarking that “Big Data” is a big business
with “an uncountable number of data-mining startups in the field”).
180. Further, a Senator in Washington, D.C. likely has less interest in an
individual’s political leanings than does a city councilperson next door. Access
to political information by personal acquaintances may actually have a greater
impact on an individual’s life than access by a national political figure.
181. Deborah G. Johnson, et al., Campaign Disclosure, Privacy, and Transparency, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 959, 980 (2011).
182. Part of Aristotle’s appeal for many years has been its data gathered
from hard-to-get public sources, “located on ledgers or computers in town
halls, state office buildings or county courthouses, each with different hours
and different rules of access.” Wayne, supra note 7, A10.
183. EU DIRECTIVE, supra note 76, at art. 8 (“Member States shall prohibit
the processing of personal data revealing . . . political opinions . . . .”). The Directive goes on to carve out exceptions, including one for non-profits with political purposes. Id.
184. See Solove & Richards, supra note 168, at 1652–53 (discussing the duality of the law’s approach to civil liability when the First Amendment is implicated).
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namely increasing voter turnout. Mandatory disclosure of datamining activities would be a narrower approach to protecting
voter autonomy.
B. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE TO PROTECT VOTER AUTONOMY
A successful voter privacy policy must satisfy three general
privacy constraints: (1) balancing free speech with ownership,
(2) providing meaningful notice and consent, and (3) holding
data-miners accountable to individuals and society.185 The ultimate goal must be to preserve intellectual “breathing room” in
which voters can autonomously make political choices.186
1. Requiring Campaigns to Disclose Voter Profiles to Individual
Voters
Campaigns should be required to disclose their datamining activity. Additionally, voters should be allowed to request their own profile from federal-level campaigns, and campaigns should have to disclose their use of outside databases.
Voters should then be allowed to choose to opt out of profiling.
However voters would not be permitted to opt out of receiving
political ads. This approach would create only a minimal burden (if any) on campaign speech, while protecting the property
rights of both individuals and data-miners. It would give adequate notice and opportunity for consent to voters, and it would
bring political data-mining into public view, where voters and
consumers would be better situated to hold data-miners accountable.
2. Constitutionality of Disclosure
The highest legal hurdle for any proposal to reform voter
privacy is the First Amendment. Political speech is core protected speech under the First Amendment, and laws limiting
such speech must be able to withstand strict scrutiny by
courts.187 To do so, the law must “further[] a compelling inter-

185. Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 8, at 1428.
186. Richards, supra note 74, at 1120 (“By protecting sheltered intellectual
exploration and the processes by which opinions and ideas are generated, data
privacy rules create expressive breathing room and intellectual autonomy and
could themselves be viewed as having First Amendment magnitude.”).
187. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898 (“[P]olitical speech must prevail
against laws that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence.”).
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est and [be] narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”188 A
proposal that instead limits commercial speech would undergo
less exacting scrutiny under the Central Hudson test.189 Any
limitation on commercial speech must directly advance a substantial government interest by means no more expansive than
necessary.190 A proposal that does not limit speech will not invoke First Amendment protections.
A voter profile disclosure law could survive strict scrutiny,
so the question of what type of speech it restricts is moot. The
compelling government interest advanced by the proposal is
voter privacy. The D.C. Circuit Court found the FEC’s prohibition on use of contribution data for fundraising purposes to
serve an important government interest, but the interest was
in the value of the donor list to the campaign, not in the privacy
of the donors.191 Nevertheless, voter privacy and autonomy
would likely be perceived as compelling government interests.
Disclosure advances the interest by revealing the sources of the
voter’s data trail. The opt-out provision would protect privacy
by giving voters control over their own personal information. To
determine whether the disclosure of profile data is narrowly
tailored, courts will examine whether the law restricts speech
no more than necessary to advance its interests. The Supreme
Court has found that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure requirements
may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling on
campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from
speaking.’”192 This disclosure requirement would place minimal
burdens on a campaign’s speech; to satisfy the disclosure requirement, all a campaign would need is an interface on its
website for voters to enter their name and address (or perhaps
a more secure username and password) to view their own digital dossier. The log-in procedure would make mining data from
the interface too burdensome for other data-miners to ex188. Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S.
449, 464 (2007).
189. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 562–63 (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally
guaranteed expression.”).
190. Id. at 564 (“The State must assert a substantial interest . . . the restriction must directly advance the state interest,” and “if the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restriction on commercial
speech, the excessive restrictions cannot survive.”).
191. Johnson et al., supra note 181, at 966 (2011).
192. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914 (2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 at 64 (1976) and McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 at 201 (2003)).
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ploit,193 so private data-miners’ business would be protected.
Further, the Court favors opt-out provisions over opt-in.194
More restrictive means of protecting privacy are imaginable but
may be impermissible under the First Amendment; banning
some or all political data-mining would seriously impede
speech, as would an opt-in provision.
3. Application
To be effective, the disclosure requirement would have to
apply to campaigns at both the state and federal level, including PACs and groups campaigning for referendums. At the
same time, placing burdens on low-visibility state and local
races could deter cash-strapped candidates from entering races,
so the requirement should only apply above a threshold spending level. The provision could be adopted either as part of general election law, or it could be made a condition of accepting
public campaign financing.
IV. CONCLUSION
When a citizen’s privacy is breached by political datamining, there is typically no villain behind the act.195 Politicians hire data firms to win elections, so data consultants are
in fact playing a positive role in public service: by identifying
voting patterns based on consumer data, campaigns can appeal
to individuals who have not previously voted, thereby increasing voter turnout.196 With no clear tortfeasor, fighting breaches
of privacy is nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the privacy inter193. Unlike the protections envisioned by Johnson et al., voters would only
be able to view one record at a time—their own. Cf. Johnson et al., supra note
181, at 978.
194. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, (1997). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (noting bystanders to offensive speech
could opt out “simply by averting their eyes”) “The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it is, in other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.” Id. By
not permitting voters to opt out of receiving political advertisements, the law
skirts a First Amendment challenge to restricting political advertising.
195. Solove, Taxonomy, supra note 13, at 559 (“In many instances, there is
no clear-cut wrongdoer, no indisputable villain whose activities lack social
value.”).
196. See Kreiss, supra note 143, at 72 (“The Obama campaign targeted priority individuals residing in heavily Republican districts, and focused on
neighborhoods with low voter turnout but high numbers of likely supporters.”).
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ests of citizens must be balanced against other valid rights and
not simply dismissed. First Amendment protections are themselves driven partly by concerns over autonomy and selfgovernment—the same concerns underlying the right to privacy. Personally identifiable data is now being constantly recorded and used in remarkable ways that can increase efficiency for
vendors, decrease the cost of running an effective campaign for
political candidates, and connect voters with candidates who
suit their tastes and preferences. Political data-mining comes
with economic and social benefits, and suppressing information
collection would be onerous and counterproductive. Adhering to
the principles of the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, voter privacy remedies should acknowledge the value of political datamining and focus on empowering voters to exercise control over
their personal information.

